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Abstract This paper investigates the causal effect of immigration on trade flows
using Italian panel data at the province level. We exploit the exceptional charac-
teristics of the Italian data (the fine geographical disaggregation, the very high
number of countries of origin of immigrants, the high heterogeneity of social and
economic characteristics of Italian provinces, and the absence of cultural or his-
torical ties with the countries where immigrants come from) coupled with the use of
a wide set of fixed effects and an ‘instrument’ based on immigrants’ enclaves. We
find that immigrants have a significant positive effect on both exports and imports,
but much larger for the latter. The pro-trade effects of immigrants tend to decline in
space, and even turn negative when large ethnic communities are located too far
away from a specific province (via a trade-diversion effect). Moreover, while our
data show inter-ethnic spillovers for exports, we find no evidence that networks
between different ethnicities affect provinces’ imports. Finally, we provide evidence
of a substantial heterogeneity in the effects of immigrants: the impact on trade tends
to be larger for immigrants coming from low-income countries, for earlier waves of
immigrants, and for least advanced provinces (Southern Italy).
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1 Introduction
At the turn of the twenty-first century, about 3 % of world population is living in a
different country from the one of origin. Similarly, more than 20 % of world
production is sent to a different country from the one where it is originated. In
dynamic terms, both migration and trade are growing at a very similar rate
(Docquier and Rapoport 2012). This paper is about the link between these two
flows, the movement of people and the movement of goods.
The positive correlation between migration and trade has been widely
documented (WTO 2013) and, in the last 20 years, many contributions, starting
from the one of Gould (1994), sharpened our knowledge about the interlinkages
between these two phenomena. However, the clear identification of the direct causal
effect of immigrants on trade flows involving the country of origin and the area of
settlement is not as smooth as it might appear. Estimates can be spoiled by the
reverse causality inherent to the fact that immigrants generally move to countries
where formal or informal links were already established and where trade with their
homeland was already preexistent. Common determinants, some of them unob-
servable, can contemporaneously affect both migration and trade. Specific
characteristics at the country of origin level, at the trading-pair level, and at the
local level in the host country, if not considered in the analysis can significantly bias
the coefficient of interest: the immigration elasticity of trade flows.
The paper—that focuses on the case of Italy between 2002 and 2009—is
organized as follows. Section 2 acts as a cornerstone and discusses the literature on
the pro-trade effects of immigrants, highlighting the traditional mechanisms behind
the commonly observed positive effect, the main empirical obstacles to the
identification strategy, and the solutions proposed by previous contributions.
Section 3 describes the characteristics of the Italian case and discusses the
anthropological notion of ‘super-diversity’ in immigration and its applicability to
contemporary Italy; points out the great economic and geographical heterogeneity
of the country; and presenting and summarizing the data used in the analysis
underlines the main advantage of working with two different levels of spatial units,
the regional and the provincial level, in order to directly tackle the issue of the
Modifiable Areal Unit Problem (MAUP) and its implications for the empirical
analysis. Section 4 includes the benchmark empirical results and stresses the
original contributions of the present paper with respect to the existing literature.
First, the risk of a spurious correlation between trade and immigration is minimized
owing to the very fine geographical scale of the analysis at the provincial level. This
also allows us to analyze the implications of the MAUP for the trade-immigration
link, to investigate geographical spillovers of immigrants on trade (Sect. 5) and to
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identify spillover causal effects. Second, the extensive country coverage of our
dataset ensures that any sample selection bias stemming from the specific choice of
the foreign countries entering the analysis has been minimized. Third, unlike most
functional forms estimated in the literature we allow for inter-ethnic spillovers. Our
specification (Sect. 5.2) allows for immigrants of other nationalities to affect trade
between an Italian province and a specific foreign country. Fourth, to rule out the
possibility of an endogeneity bias that could inflate our coefficients of interest, we
control for omitted common determinants including time-varying foreign-country-
specific, time-varying region-specific and trading-pair fixed effects in the
regressions. In Sect. 6, we also make use of an Instrumental Variables (IVs,
hereafter) approach a` la Altonji and Card (1991), where the geographical
distribution of immigrants’ residence permits in 1995 (the earliest year for which
comparable geographical data are available) and immigrants’ flows at the
nationwide level serve to compute an instrument (the imputed stock of
immigrants). Fifth, we bring to the data the two main explanations highlighted
in the literature: the business and social network effect a` la Rauch (2001) (i.e.,
immigrants foster both bilateral imports and exports because of their superior
knowledge of, or preferential access to, market opportunities in their home
country) and the transplanted home bias effect (Gould 1994; White 2007) (i.e.,
immigrants promote imports of their home country consumption-goods to satisfy
their different consumption tastes) estimating the pro-trade effect of immigrants
on both export and import flows. Finally, we give evidence (Sect. 7) of the
heterogeneous effects of immigrants on trade according to the level of per capita
income of their country of origin, their education level, the timing of arrival
(distinguishing between ethnic groups participating to the first or the second wave
of immigration) and their geographical location in Italy (distinguishing between
Northern and Southern Italy).
Section 8 summarizes the paper’s main findings. The Online-Appendices include
the full description of the variables used, the list of the foreign countries considered
in the analysis, a discussion of the role of fixed effects in saturating the empirical
model, a description of the empirical attempts related to the inclusion of zero-trade
flows in the analysis, and the discussion of the peculiar role played by large Italian
cities such as Rome and Milan.
2 A selective literature review
The international trade literature based on the estimate of a gravity equation—where
trade flows between a regional entity i and its international counterpart j are
positively associated with economic attractors, such as the GDPs of i and j, and
negatively associated with obstacles to international trade, such as geographical
distance—has generally found a strong association between immigration and trade.1
The presence in i of immigrants from j can be considered as force of attraction,
1 See De Benedictis and Taglioni (2011) for an empirically oriented review of the literature on the
gravity model in international trade, and Head and Mayer (2014) for a state of the art survey.
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fostering international trade between i and j. Different studies (Head and Ries 1998;
Dunlevy and Hutchinson 1999; Rauch and Trindade 2002; Girma and Yu 2002;
Coughlin and Wall 2011), using different samples, periods and estimation
techniques have generally reported a strong positive association between immi-
grants and trade. Some recent papers have also made attempts to qualify such
association as causal using IVs methods (Briant et al. 2009; Peri and Requena-
Silvente 2010).
In Fig. 1 we summarize the results of a sample of relevant contributions to the
literature in terms of the estimated elasticity of trade to the stock of immigrants. Black
dots depict imports, white dots exports, and black horizontal segments indicate 95 %
confidence intervals. The two vertical dotted lines correspond to the meta-modal
elasticity estimated in Genc et al. (2012), which is 0.12 for exports and 0.15 for imports.
As it is evident, the estimates show a high degree of variability. Between the seminal
contribution by Gould (1994), that basically gave origin to this new stream of research,
and 2002, the literature was dominated by cross-country studies. Wagner et al. (2002)
established the standard in the subsequent set of contributions, highlighting the role of
two fundamental ingredients: (a) country-fixed effects, to control for omitted variable
bias; (b) the use of regional data, to exploit cross-sectional variation on trade and
immigration at the sub-national level (for Canada, in their original analysis) and to deal
with the endogeneity bias mentioned in Sect. 1. Since Wagner et al. (2002) the
variability in the estimates reduces substantially.
Figure 1 shows one first important evidence of the literature: the elasticity of
imports to immigrants is higher than that of exports, and both are positive and
generally significantly different from zero. This is generally rationalized calling
upon two common explanations of the pro-trade effects of immigrants. The main
explanation is rooted in the idea that information costs play a major role in the fixed
cost that firms pay to enter foreign markets. In the seminal contributions of Rauch
(1999, 2001), ethnic networks related to migration flows are likely to reduce some
of these information costs. Cross-border networks of people sharing the same
country of origin can substitute or integrate organized markets in matching
international demand and supply.2
A further point associated with this first explanation is related to the
characteristics of immigrants and how these characteristics can reduce the fixed
cost of exporting. Language, specific knowledge of homeland institutions and
norms, familiarity with homeland (excess) demand, can bridge the home country
and the host country, if these assets are positively valued and acquired by firms
producing in the country were immigrants settled (Wagner et al. 2002; Peri and
Requena-Silvente 2010). Moreover, ‘‘immigrant networks may provide contract
enforcement through sanctions and exclusions, which substitutes for weak
institutional rules and reduces trade costs,’’ (Briant et al. 2009). Following Rauch
(2001), this explanation has been named the business and social network effect of
immigrants on trade.
2 Several studies have explored the role of ethnic networks in international trade since Rauch (2001).
See, among others, Rauch and Trindade (2002), Epstein and Gang (2004), Felbermayr et al. (2010),
Coughlin and Wall (2011), and Hiller (2013).
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The second, less explored explanation, is that immigrants are characterized by
different habits in consumption with respect to natives, and they may slowly modify
their original home-biased demand after settling in the host country (see Gould
(1994) for an innovative discussion of the issue). Since homeland goods are more
costly in the host country, immigrants have an incentive to buy those goods from the
home country itself. Proper empirical evidence on what has been called by White
(2007) the transplanted home bias effect of immigrants on trade was, until recently,
basically non existent (White and Tedesse 2007). The significance and magnitude of
the effect was generally inferred from the difference between the estimated
immigrant-elasticity of imports (to which both effects were contributing) and
exports (not affected by the transplanted home bias effect). Since, as it is evident
from Fig. 1, the immigrants elasticity of imports tends to be higher than that of
exports, this was interpreted by deductive reasoning as supporting the idea that there
should be something forcing the two elasticities to be different, and this ‘something’
was attributed to a persistent difference in tastes between immigrants and natives.
Yet it must be noted that the presence of immigrants might also result in the medium
or long term in a certain shift of province’s i production toward the preferences of
immigrants. This shift raises chances of exporting to country j, while it also reduces
the need for immigrants and natives to satisfy their specific demands from country j,
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Fig. 1 The figure plots estimates obtained from several contributions to the literature on the effect of
immigration on trade. Black dots indicate the elasticity of imports to immigrants, white dots that of
exports, black horizontal segments indicate 95 % confidence intervals. The two dotted vertical lines
correspond to the meta-modal elasticity estimated in Genc et al. (2012), which is 0.12 for exports and 0.15
for imports. The horizontal axis is trimmed for visual purposes. The seminal contribution by Gould
(1994) did not use a gravity equation framework and the estimated elasticities are not comparable and
omitted from the plot. The complete list of papers is included in the References
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thus possibility decreasing imports between i and j. Hence, there is no particular
reason to believe that, in the long run, the trade-enhancing effect of immigrants
would be larger for imports than for exports.
Recently, some more clear evidence of the relevance of the transplanted home
bias effect has been provided by Bronnenberg et al. (2012), Mazzolari and Neumark
(2012) and Atkin (2013) using microdata.
While more recent contributions have disregarded the effect of immigrants on
imports (see the regional-level estimates in Fig. 1), in the following analysis we
look at both the export and import elasticities to immigrants, so as to give
quantitative content to both the business and social network effect and the
transplanted home bias effect of immigrants on trade.
3 Italy as a case study: motivation, data and descriptive statistics
Following Wagner et al. (2002) and the subsequent contributions discussed in the
previous section, our analysis takes a single-country perspective examining the
Italian case during the 2000s. Looking at this specific case has not only an interest
per se, but offers many insights on a more general basis. First, Italy shares some
common features with many (OECD and non-OECD) immigration countries: in the
year 2000, the percentage of the Italian population that was born abroad was 4.1 %,
and it grew steadily between 2000 and 2009, reaching the total number of 4.2
million foreign-born residents, meaning that 7 % of Italian residents were born in a
different country (ISTAT 2011). Second, the large heterogeneity of the countries of
origin of immigrants in Italy makes the Italian case relevant for other recipient
countries as well. Moreover, the very fine geographical disaggregation of the Italian
longitudinal data on trade and migration allows us to adopt a reliable empirical
strategy for the identification of the effect of immigration on international trade. For
all these features, we think that our analysis offers some generally informative
indications on the interplay between immigration and international trade, giving a
contribution to the ongoing policy debate on the issue.
The Italian immigration case is characterized by what anthropologists call
‘‘super-diversity’’ (Vertovec 2007), a notion intended to emphasize the level and
kind of complexity in immigrants’ social and economic participation in national
everyday life, way above anything the country had previously experienced. The
relevant ingredients of super-diverse immigration are ‘‘...the increased number of
new, small and scattered, multiple-origin, transnationally connected, socio-eco-
nomically differentiated and legally stratified immigrants who have arrived over the
last decade,’’ (Vertovec 2006). This seems to fit Italy quite well.
In Italy, the phenomenon of massive immigration is quite recent. Italy was a land
of emigrants at least until the 1960s, and the migration balance started showing a
positive sign only in the 1970s. To the traditional ethnic groups coming from North
Africa, often on a temporary basis, a new diaspora of permanent (essentially
housemaid) workers entered Italy from the Philippines, Cape Verde and Sri Lanka.
In the 1980s, immigrants coming from Central Africa (Senegal, Nigeria, Coˆte
d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso), South America (Peru, Dominican Republic), the Indian
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sub-continent (India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka again) and Asia (China) settled
permanently in Italy. The more recent wave of immigration took place in the 1990s.
It started in 1991 with the dramatic outflow from Albania and became even more
numerically relevant with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the entrance of Poland,
first, and Romania, afterwards, in the European Union. The 2000s—covered by our
analysis—is a period of growing immigration characterized by the emergence of
new ethnic groups and the downsizing of others. As a result, the geographical
coverage of the Italian immigration data is remarkable, allowing to account for 187
countries of origin of immigrants.3
In our empirical analysis, we turn to our advantage the minimal historical
participation of Italy to colonialism. As emphasized by Briant et al. (2009), in
country-level analyses there are very good reasons to suspect that the correlation
between trade and immigration might depend on one or more omitted common
determinants (such as colonial ties, common language or cultural proximity). In the
Italian case, differently from other cases such as the UK (and the London area in
particular) or France and the US (and the New York area in particular), the super-
diversity of the many ethnicities now living in Italy is largely unrelated to colonial
heritage, linguistic or genetic proximity or institutional and cultural similarity. This
characteristic of the Italian case is therefore particularly convenient for the
identification of the causal effect that immigrants have on trade flows in and out of
Italy.4
The fine administrative/territorial detail of the Italian data used in the analysis is
supplementarily advantageous from an empirical standpoint. On the one hand, in
line with some recent contributions on trade and immigration (Wagner et al. 2002;
Dunlevy 2006; Bandyopadhyay et al. 2008; Briant et al. 2009; Peri and Requena-
Silvente 2010; Herander and Saavedra 2005) the choice of a small spatial unit of
analysis allows us to better control for unobserved heterogeneity (such as the
matching of a the specific skill or task ability of a certain immigrant ethnic group
and the production structure of the hosting geographical area) through fixed effects.5
On the other hand, the choice of the appropriate spatial unit of analysis is of primary
relevance if there is evidence of a MAUP. As in the case of the ‘ecological fallacy’
(Jargowsky 2005) or the ‘Simpson’s paradox’ (Samuels 1993), the bias associated
with MAUP depends on the loss in variation due to data aggregation in arbitrary
zonal units. In general, if the grouping process that guided the zonal aggregation is
related to an omitted variable which is correlated with the variables of interest, the
solution is to control for that omitted variable [see Briant et al. (2010) on this issue].
3 The Italian dataset guarantees the most extensive countries’ coverage among those considered in the
empirical literature, reducing the risk that the selection of specific countries may bias the estimates of the
elasticity of trade to immigration.
4 Colonial origins and linguistic proximity can both influence trade—and so they do in the traditional
analyses of bilateral trade based on the gravity model [see Head et al. (2010), Helliwell (1999), Debaere
et al. (2013) and De Benedictis and Taglioni (2011), Anderson (2011) and Head and Mayer (2014) for a
review of the gravity model in international trade]—and immigration and, therefore, they can confound
the relationship between immigrants and trade flows.
5 To the best of our knowledge, the Italian provinces are the smallest geographical entities used so far to
investigate the link between immigration and trade.
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In our case, we can do better than that, tackling the MAUP at the origin through the
use of both regional (NUTS-2)6—20 regions of an average size of 14,000 square
km—and provincial (NUTS-3) Italian data—namely 107 Italian provinces of an
average size of 2,800 square km—and comparing the results at the two levels of
spatial analysis.7 The evidence goes in favor of the use of provincial data. This areal
unit is also relatively more appropriate from a theoretical viewpoint. Indeed, the
most popular explanations for the pro-trade effects of immigrants (see Sect. 2) are
based on interactions and knowledge flows between natives and immigrants. These
interactions are likely to depend on the distance between individuals, and are
accordingly more precisely captured if the geographical units of analysis are small
areas such as NUTS-3, rather than countries or NUTS-2 like regional units.
The choice of a very fine spatial unit of analysis comes with a problematic side-
effect: the very large number of (trading-pair) fixed effects necessary to control for
(dyadic) unobserved heterogeneity. As it is explained in Online-Appendix C and
Sect. 4, accounting for the role of zeros in the dependent variable, or in other terms
including in the analysis the effect of immigrants on the extensive margin of trade,
might imply serious computational problems. The use of nonlinear models such as
the Pseudo Poisson Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimator, proposed by Santos
Silva and Tenreyro (2006) in order to reduce the estimation bias of log-linear
models (Santos Silva and Tenreyro 2011), or the EK-Tobit model (Eaton and
Kortum 2001), clashes with the use of a large set of fixed effects that hamper
convergence. In what follows, we propose an empirical strategy to overcome the
trade-off between the use of nonlinear estimators and the instrumental use of fixed
effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity.
The data used in the analysis come mainly from two publicly available data
sources collected by the Italian National Statistical Institute (ISTAT). Trade flow
data refer to the value of imports and exports of 107 Italian provinces (NUTS-3)
with 210 countries, over the period 2002–2009.8 The trade data are originally
measured in euros, and report export and import flows between the Italian province
6 For the unfamiliar reader, NUTS stands for Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics and is a
European Union geocode standard for referencing the subdivisions of countries for statistical purposes.
There are three zonal levels, NUTS-1, NUTS-2 and NUTS-3, which for Italy correspond to the country,
region (regione) and province (provincia) levels, which also correspond to the three main administrative
units of the country.
7 To be more precise, the mean area of Italian provinces is 2,816 square km with a coefficient of variation
of 0.17, almost 57 times tinier than American states (162,176 square km, when Alaska and Washington
DC are included), and more than 200 times smaller than Canadian provinces (606,293 square km when
Nunavut, North-West and Yukon territories are excluded). These administrative units are also much
smaller and more regular in size with respect to French metropolitan de´partements and Spanish provinces.
The mean area of French de´partements is 5,666 square km with a coefficient of variation of 0.33 (when
Corsica and overseas French regions are excluded), whereas the related figures for Spanish provinces are
10,118 square km with a coefficient of variation of 0.47 (excluding Ceuta and Melilla).
8 More precisely, we consider 103 provinces until 2006 and 107 afterwards. The number of Italian
provinces changed in recent times, as reported by ISTAT. In the mid 1990s the number of Italian
provinces was 103. In 2001 the Sardinia autonomous region established 4 new provinces, that became
operative during 2005. In 2004 the Italian Parliament established 3 new provinces that became operative
in 2009. The total actual number of provinces is 110. Since our dataset does not include observations for
the years after 2009, we do not consider these latter changes in the number of Italian provinces.
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of shipment, i.e., the province where the custom transaction was registered, and the
foreign country of destination (for exports) and of origin (for imports).9 Information
on the number of foreign born residents by Italian province or region and foreign
country of origin is obtained from ISTAT as well, and covers the same period. Our
explanatory variable of interest is the stock of legal immigrants by country of origin
(home country) and province (or region) of destination in Italy, defining immigrants
as residents born abroad with a foreign nationality.10
Table 1 Immigrants by country of origin (top 20)
Ranking
in 2009
Country of
origin
ISO3
country
code
Number of
immigrants
% of total
immigrants
in 2009
Annual growth
rate, 2002/2009
(%)
Ranking
in 2002
(1) Romania ROM 887,763 20.96 40.45 (3)
(2) Albania ALB 466,684 11.02 11.76 (1)
(3) Morocco MAR 431,529 10.19 10.51 (2)
(4) China CHN 188,352 4.45 15.51 (4)
(5) Ukraine UKR 174,129 4.11 68.99 (28)
(6) Philippines PHL 123,584 2.92 9.67 (5)
(7) India IND 105,863 2.50 16.99 (9)
(8) Poland POL 105,608 2.49 20.04 (15)
(9) Moldova MDA 105,600 2.49 60.20 (40)
(10) Tunisia TUN 103,678 2.45 8.33 (6)
(11) Macedonia MKD 92,847 2.19 16.25 (12)
(12) Peru PER 87,747 2.07 14.60 (10)
(13) Ecuador EQU 85,940 2.03 32.67 (25)
(14) Egypt EGY 82,064 1.94 13.82 (13)
(15) Sri Lanka LKA 75,343 1.78 11.99 (11)
(16) Bangladesh BGD 73,965 1.75 20.27 (20)
(17) Senegal SEN 72,618 1.71 10.24 (8)
(18) Pakistan PAK 64,859 1.53 16.72 (18)
(19) Serbia SRB 57,877 1.37 1.19 (7)
(20) Nigeria NGA 48,674 1.15 12.97 (19)
Top 20 countries 3,434,724 81.1 20.66
TOTAL 4,223,154 100 14.9
Source ISTAT
9 The information of Extra-EU transactions is based on the ‘‘Documento Amministrativo Unico’’ (DAU),
for the intra-EU exchanges the custom system has been replaced, since 1993, by the Intrastat standard.
The original values of trade flows, in euros, have been converted in US dollars using the nominal
exchange rate from the World Development Indicators (WDIs on-line database) in order to make them
consistent with GDP data used in the gravity equations. The conversion is not influencing the results,
since in the multivariate regression in Sect. 4 we use country time-varying fixed effects.
10 Like all previous papers on the topic, we only consider legal immigrants. Direct information on the
stocks of immigrants with illegal status is not available. However, Bianchi et al. (2012) using data on
years in which there were immigration amnesties in Italy show a very high correlation between the
number of illegal immigrants and the stock of legal immigrants already present at the province level.
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Of the 187 ethnic groups included in the dataset, Table 1 shows the top 20
countries of origin of immigrants in 2009. The top five countries by number of
immigrants were Romania, Albania, Morocco, China and Ukraine, accounting for
about 50 % of the total foreign-born population. Comparing the rank of these top 20
countries of origin in 2002, and especially the average growth rate over the period,
gives an idea of the change in the composition of immigrants by country of origin.
In 2009, the majority of the foreign-born population came from Eastern Europe
(Romania, Albania, Ukraine, Rep. of Moldova, Poland), the area which experienced
also the highest growth rate of immigration over the period.
An interesting feature of the immigration pattern in Italy is the uneven
distribution of immigrants across Italian provinces. Figure 2 shows a map of Italy
where provinces are colored according to the share of foreign-born population in the
total population, with ‘darker’ provinces hosting a higher share of immigrants.
While in 2002 none of the 103 provinces registered a share higher than 10 %, in
2009 twenty three provinces exceeded the level of 10 % of foreign born residents,
mainly in the Center and the North of the country. The map of Italy also reveals
some spatial clustering of immigrants: immigrant-abundant provinces are more
likely to be close to each other. We address the potential consequences of this issue
for our analysis in Sect. 5 where we account for spillover effects from immigrants
Fig. 2 Percentage of foreign-born population across Italian provinces. Year 2002 (a) and year 2009 (b).
Note: The two cartograms plot the share of foreign-born population in the total population, with ‘darker’
provinces hosting a higher share of immigrants, in 2002 (a) and 2009 (b). The concentric circles around
the cities of Genoa (in the North), Naples (in the South) and Palermo (in the Sicily island) in panel
(a) describe the hypothetical boundaries for neighboring provinces 25, 50, 100 and 200 km apart. We
limited three drawing to three exemplificative cases for graphical purposes
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of the same ethnic group in neighboring provinces, as visualized for the case of
Genoa, Naples and Palermo as concentric circles in panel (a) of Fig. 2.
Although the distribution of foreign residents across provinces reveals a relative
concentration in Northern Italy, the number of provinces with zero immigrants from
a particular country of origin is rather small. This is an instance of the Italian ‘super-
diversity’. Table 2 reports the mean number of nationalities registered in each
province at the beginning and at the end of the period under study: the value is
around 111 in 2002, and about 125 in 2009. Provinces with less coverage of
nationalities are in the South of Italy, as is intuitable from Fig. 2.
If we look at the distribution of immigrants from the perspective of each ethnic
community, immigrants from the same country of origin located, on average, in 82
out of the 103 Italian provinces in 2002, and in 90 out of 107 Italian provinces in
2009. The distribution is far from being uniform: some immigrant communities are
concentrated in a limited number of provinces (the minimum number of provinces
for an immigrant community is just 1), others are spread all over Italy (the observed
maximum always hits the theoretical one, i.e., the number of existing provinces).
Focusing on the twenty most numerically relevant nationalities, we register huge
differences in their geographical settlement. The most concentrated groups are from
Egypt, Ecuador and the Philippines. In 2009, the distribution exhibits a coefficient
of variation11 from 40 to 80 % higher than the median value. On average, around
70 % of these communities is located in the first five provinces of residence. The
degree of concentration is relatively high compared to Albania, Morocco and
Tunisia, the most evenly distributed nationalities. In this case the first five locations
account for less than 25 % of total residents. The most widely represented country
of origin (Romania) records over 139,000 residents just in the province of Rome.
The provinces of Rome and Milan, the administrative and economic centers of the
nation respectively, play an attractive role that make them different from other
provinces. We control for this peculiarity in the multivariate analysis reported in
Sect. 4. The incidence of zeros in the full dataset is relatively high. On average we
observe zero flows for 48 % of imports and 29 % of exports of province i coming
Table 2 Migrants’ location by province and country of origin
Mean SD Min 25p Median 75p Max
Year: 2002
Foreign nationalities per province 111.92 23.39 49 97 112 128 175
Provinces per foreign nationality 82.07 24.37 1 68 95 102 103
Year: 2009
Foreign nationalities per province 124.91 20.46 58 113 126 139 179
Provinces per foreign nationality 90.23 22.35 1 83 100 106 107
25p stands for 25th percentile, while 75p stands for 75th percentile. The total number of Italian provinces
is 103 (107 from 2006) while the total number of foreign nationalities is 187
11 The coefficient of variation refers to the distribution of the province’s share of the total number of
foreign residents by nationality.
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from or directed toward the foreign country j, while for immigrants’ stocks, the
percentage of zeros is 39 %. The issue of zeros is also discussed in Sect. 4.
The definitions of the variables used in our analysis are reported in Online-
Appendix A.
4 Empirical results
The main steps of our empirical strategy are dictated by the need to control for
possible reverse causality (from trade to immigration) and the omission of common
variables affecting both trade and immigration in the same direction. We operate in
sequence. In Sect. 4.1 we assume that, after controlling for a wide range of fixed
effects, immigrant stocks are exogenous with respect to trade, and use ordinary least
squares (OLS). In Sect. 5 we take into account the complexity of the trade data and
allow for both geographic and inter-ethnic spillovers, still retaining the assumption
of exogeneity. In Sect. 6 we deal with the remaining potential endogeneity of
immigration, instrumenting the stock of immigrants with an imputed variable
related to past ethnic diasporas in Italian provinces, and report 2SLS estimates.
Finally, Sect. 7 sheds light on the possible heterogeneous effects of immigrants.
4.1 Ordinary least squares and MAUP
Our starting point is the following Anderson and Wincoop (2003) theoretically
founded specification of the gravity equation:12
lnð1 þ XijtÞ ¼ drj þ hjt þ /rt þ a lnðYit1 Yjt1Þ þ b lnð1 þ IMMijt1Þ
þ c lnðdistanceijÞ þ q contiguityij þ ijt
ð1Þ
where i is the subscript for Italian provinces (NUTS-3), r is the subscript for the
region where province i is located (NUTS-2), j indicates the foreign country (i.e.,
the country of origin of immigrants), and t stands for time. drj are region-country
(trading-pair) fixed effects, hjt are country-year fixed effects, and /rt region-year
fixed effects. Xijt is trade (exports or imports) between province i and country j at
time t. Yit1 and Yjt1 are province and foreign countries GDPs at time t  1,
respectively, and IMMijt1 is the stock of immigrants from country j located in
province i, acting as a trade-enhancing force in contraposition with distanceij, which
is the great-circle distance between province i and country j. Contiguityij is a
dummy for contiguity between the Italian province i and the foreign country j,
included to take into account possible nonlinearities in distance. Trade flows cover
the 2003–2009 period and immigration stocks the 2002–2008 period. Covariates are
12 The Anderson and Wincoop (2003) specification of the gravity equation can be derived from micro-
foundations, and results from an expenditure function that takes into account the fundamental role of
general equilibrium effects in trade: aka, the multilateral resistance index. See De Benedictis and Taglioni
(2011), Anderson (2011) and Head and Mayer (2014) on the theoretical foundation of the gravity
equation.
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predetermined and time-lagged. Finally, ijt is an error term clustered at the prov-
ince-country level.
In order to be consistent with the previous literature, we use a log-log version of
the gravity model, and to retain observations with zeros in either trade flows or
immigrant stocks, we follow Dunlevy (2006), Peri and Requena-Silvente (2010),
Coughlin and Wall (2011), Artal-Tur et al. (2012) adding a constant equal to one to
both bilateral trade flows and the stock of immigrants. Since trade is measured in
dollar units (rather than thousands, millions or billions of dollars) this is likely to
introduce only a small measurement error in the observations with zero trade (see
Liu 2009). Previous contributions treated zero trade observations in different ways.
Bandyopadhyay et al. (2008), for instance, restricted the analysis to the observations
with positive trade. However, in general, doing this way one is likely to neglect the
effect of immigrants on the extensive margin of trade (i.e., the existence of a trade
link), which is likely to be a relevant dimension of the trade-creation effect of
immigration.
It is worth noting that we are not including in the gravity equation province-
country and province-year fixed effects because they would absorb almost all
variation in both trade and immigration, leaving virtually nothing else to be
explained (this is a crucial point in our analysis, and we give full account of it in
Online-Appendix B). By contrast, we use larger geographical units (NUTS-2
administrative areas) to define region-country fixed effects (drj), and region-year
fixed effects (/rt). This enables us to control for unobserved heterogeneity at the
regional level and still be able to exploit within-region variation across provinces
(i.e., cross-sectional variation between provinces located in the same region) in both
trade and immigration to identify the effect of interest. A similar approach was used
by Wagner et al. (2002), which exploited cross-sectional variation between
Canadian provinces to investigate the effect of immigration on trade. We bring their
original idea a step further in the spatial dimension. Another reason to opt for a
specification including region-country fixed effects is related to the IVs-based
identification strategy we use in Sect. 6. As we report in that Section, when using a
log-log specification and instruments based on a shift-and-share analysis, in which
the lagged distribution of immigrants across provinces is used to build the
instrument, including province-country fixed effects instead of region-country fixed
effects, would make the 2SLS estimates be identified by nonlinearity only, and not
by an exclusion restriction.
The specification of Eq. (1) is to the best of our knowledge one of the most
comprehensive used in the literature in terms of the set of fixed effects included.
Early papers did not include importer or exporter dummies (see, for instance, Head
and Ries 1998; Girma and Yu 2002). Several subsequent contributions to the
literature included importer and/or exporter fixed effects (Dunlevy 2006; Wagner
et al. 2002; Santos Silva and Tenreyro 2006; Briant et al. 2009). Some recent papers
using sub-national level data include trading-pair and year fixed effects (Bandyo-
padhyay et al. 2008) or trading-pair and country-year fixed effects (Peri and
Requena-Silvente 2010; Coughlin and Wall 2011) but region-year fixed effects are
generally omitted. In our specific case, trading-pair fixed effects are likely to
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account for factors that may spur trade between an Italian region and a specific
country such as cultural proximity or historical ties (e.g., past Italian emigration
from a given province toward a certain foreign country), country-year dummies are
likely to capture time-variant foreign countries’ economic, social and political
events (e.g., the entry in the EU, military conflicts or economic crises) which are
likely to affect both trade and migration flows toward Italian provinces, and region-
year dummies capture features such as the state of the local economy which may
affect both trade and immigration flows from foreign countries. Hence, the focus on
sub-national variation within the same country coupled with the inclusion of a wide
range of fixed effects is likely to attenuate the potential endogeneity problems of
immigration with respect to trade. For this reason, we use in this section the OLS
estimator, clustering standard errors at the province-country level.
We also report the results from specifications that include fewer fixed effects, to
stress the importance of controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. In these
specifications we also include (for comparison with previous analyses at the
European level) a dummy for EU or EFTA countries, whenever it is not absorbed by
the fixed effects included (or not dropped due to collinearity). Panel (a) of Table 3
reports the results for exports. In column (1) we report the results of a specification
only including time dummies (year fixed effects): the estimated elasticity of exports
with respect to immigration is very high, at 0.506, meaning that a 1 % increase in
the stock of immigrants settled in an Italian province raises exports from that
province to the country of origin of immigrants by about 0.5 %.13 Column (2)
reports a specification which is very popular in the literature, which controls for
separate region, country and year fixed effects. The coefficient on the stock of
immigrants more than halves (0.206). Column (3) extends this specification
allowing for time-variant country and region fixed effects, which has however little
effect on the estimated elasticity. Columns (4) and (5) show the importance of
controlling for trading-pair unobserved heterogeneity through trading-pair fixed
effects. Including such fixed effects has a huge impact on the estimated elasticity,
which becomes 0.058 in our preferred specification of Eq. (1) (column (5)), i.e.,
almost 10 times smaller than in column (1).
When we consider imports—in panel (b) of Table 3—we find a similar fall in the
estimated elasticities by progressively adopting richer specifications in terms of
fixed effects. The elasticity of imports with respect to immigrants is 0.796 in column
(1). It falls to 0.362 when adding trading-pair fixed effects in column (4). Also in
this case, comparison of column (2) with the following columns shows that, as for
exports, most unobserved heterogeneity is captured by the trading-pair fixed effects,
and the estimated elasticity turns out to be only marginally affected by the inclusion
of other fixed effects. In the benchmark specification in column (5) the elasticity of
imports with respect to immigrants is 0.344. Also for imports, as for exports, the
coefficient on immigration is always statistically significant at least at the 1 % level.
13 All provinces of Sardinia are omitted from the analysis in 2006. This depends on the fact that, as we
said above, four new provinces were created in Sardinia and we do not have lagged values for the
independent variables for 2006.
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Thus, as predicted by economic theory and confirmed in most of the previous
literature, our estimate of the elasticity of imports with respect to immigrant stocks
is much larger than that of exports. This stems from the fact that while both the
transplanted home bias effect and the business and social networks effects are at
work for imports, only the second causal pathway affects exports.
The first step done, we deal now with possible concerns regarding the OLS
estimates. To begin with, the log-log version of the gravity model has been recently
subject to some criticism by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006). The debate on the
most appropriate nonlinear estimator to be applied when zeros are a relevant
proportion of trade flows is still very open.14 In the present case, the use of the
PPML estimator proposed by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) clashes with the
inclusion of trading-pair fixed effects. The very high number of fixed effects
prevents us from using any other nonlinear estimator or from applying the Heckit
estimator as in Helpman et al. (2008) or the threshold Tobit model of Eaton and
Tamura (1994) to account for zero-trade observations, since both require estimating
a Probit model which suffers from an incidental parameters problem.15 In
conclusion, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity through region-country fixed
effects, which appears to be crucial according to Table 3, makes the log-log
specification the sole feasible option among the many possible different alternatives.
For the sake of brevity, a full account of our attempts to deal with zero-trade
observations is reported in Online-Appendix C. More in general, the present case is
indeed paradigmatic in terms of the trade-off between accounting for unobserved
heterogeneity in trade data (through fixed effects) and using nonlinear models to
estimate the gravity equation.
We checked nonetheless the sensitivity of our results to alternative transforma-
tions of the dependent variables (exports and imports) which allow us to retain the
zero-trade observations in the estimation but still maintaining the linear specifica-
tion. We tried (i) adding to exports and imports 0.1 (i.e., 10 cents of a dollar) instead
of one dollar before taking natural logarithms; and (ii) using an inverse hyperbolic
sine (IHS) transformation (Burbidge et al. 1988).16 Using the benchmark model of
column (5), in the first case we obtain point estimates of 0.027 and 0.369 for exports
and imports respectively, while in the second case (IHS) the estimates are 0.049 and
0.352. In both cases, the estimates were not statistically different from those
reported in column (5) of Table 3.17
14 See De Benedictis and Taglioni (2011) and Head and Mayer (2014) on this specific point of the gravity
literature.
15 In general, studies using a poisson specification or other nonlinear models adopt a much less richer set
of fixed effects. Just to take two examples, Helpman et al. (2008) include separate importer, exporter and
year fixed effects, while Eaton and Tamura (1994) include separate region, sub-continent and year fixed
effects.
16 The inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) transformation consists of replacing Xijt with lnðXijt þ ðX2ijt þ 1Þ1=2Þ.
In this case, as in the traditional logarithmic transformation, if the values of Xijt are not too small, the
coefficients of the covariates can be interpreted as elasticities.
17 Like for all the attempts enumerated in Online-Appendix C, all these estimates are available from the
authors upon request.
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A second issue involves the peculiarity of Rome and Milan, the two largest cities
in Italy. Their specificity is associated with their nature of trade hubs, size and
density of economic activity, the peculiar characteristic of a capital city (for Rome)
and the main Italian economic center (for Milan), and the associated historical
presence of ethnic enclaves. Indeed, thanks to the presence of agglomeration
economies, firms located in these two cities are likely to be the most productive and
efficient, and export their goods irrespective of the presence of immigrants. In other
words, they may act as outliers in the trade-immigration relationship. This is indeed
confirmed in Online-Appendix D, in which we estimate a negative association
between immigrants and trade for Rome and Milan. For this reason, in column (6) of
Table 3 we have reported the estimates excluding Rome and Milan. Interestingly
enough, while the elasticity of imports remains virtually unchanged (0.347), the
elasticity of exports doubles in magnitude (0.121) and is in line with that
estimated in the past literature. On the basis of this evidence, and the peculiarity
of Rome and Milan, we put more emphasis on the estimates excluding these two
provinces. Accordingly, in later Sections we only present the 2SLS estimates
excluding these provinces from the estimation samples. As we said, the inclusion
of these provinces generally tends to lower the magnitude and significance level
of the elasticity of exports with respect to immigration, while it has no effect for
imports.18
A third concern is related to the existence of spatial correlation in the error term.
This issue is further discussed in Sect. 5. Here, we simply estimate specification (6)
with standard errors which are robust to the presence of very general forms of
spatial dependence in the data (Driscoll and Kraay 1998). Since the routine used to
compute the standard errors (Hoechle 2007) did not provide them at the first
attempt, we partialled out all fixed effects from the dependent and the independent
variables, and then estimated the models using the residuals. We did not observe any
relevant change in the statistical significance of the coefficient of the stock of
immigrants.19
A final concern regards the appropriate choice of the spatial unit in case there is
evidence of a MAUP. As we explained above, a unique feature of our dataset is that
it gives us the opportunity to deal with the MAUP in a very straight way, assessing
the impact of the size of the areal units chosen on the magnitude and the significance
of trade elasticities to immigration. We estimated a specification similar to Eq. (3)
on regional data and the results are reported in Online-Appendix E. Curiously
enough when working with the regional dimension, and controlling for trading-pair
fixed effects, the relationship between trade and the stock of immigrants looses
statistical significance and even turns negative. This analysis shows the potential
advantages of working with very small geographical units when assessing the
impact of immigration on trade. In summary, the comparison of the province-level
18 The complete set of estimates is available from the authors upon request. We also estimated the
benchmark specification on the whole sample but including province fixed effects to account for the
specificity of Rome and Milan, and obtained estimates very close to those in column (5). We then
preferred to omit from the sample these two provinces given their clear nature of outliers in the trade-
immigration relationship (see Online-Appendix D).
19 Estimates are available upon request.
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with the region-level results suggests that the MAUP is an important issue in the
analysis of the pro-trade effects of immigrants. This implies that the geographical
aggregation of the areal units makes a difference when estimating the relation of
interest, and accordingly that geographic distance between natives and immigrant
networks is a key factor. Indeed, were these effects not affected by distance, we
would not observe any difference in the coefficient estimates when assessing the
link at the province or at the region level, i.e., using an aggregation of areal units
positively correlated with distance. For this reason, in the next section we
investigate more directly the potential importance of geographical spillovers for the
trade-immigration nexus.
5 Geographic and inter-ethnic spillovers of immigrants on trade
Correlation across the errors of observations related to different provinces and
different countries could be generated by omitted variables which are correlated
with the included regressors. Take for instance Eq. (1) in which only
immigrants from country j in province i are allowed to affect trade between
province i and country j. This is a restrictive specification. Indeed, one may posit
that immigrants of the same nationality located in neighboring provinces also
affect trade between j and i. This may happen, for instance, because immigrants
commute between provinces, so as they do not necessarily reside where they
work.20 This is a case of inter-province spillovers. These omitted stocks of
immigrants may also be related with that in province i generating an omitted
variables bias.
The same could be said for immigrants of other nationalities located in province
i. Equation (1) implies that networks from country j only influence trade from and to
j. But this is not necessarily the case. In fact, there might be inter-ethnic spillovers.21
As for imports, for instance, it is true that immigrants consume so-called ethnic
goods, but these are not neatly differentiated across political borders. The imports
from, say, Peru could be stimulated by the presence of large immigrant communities
from other Latin American countries, for instance Ecuador, in the same province.
Moreover, Peruvians’ and Ecuadorians’ location choices may be spatially corre-
lated, generating an omitted variables bias if we omit the stock of Ecuadorians in the
analysis of trade between Peru and province i. This is likely to happen especially for
‘close’ ethnic group, where closeness may be intended in terms of geographical
distance of their countries of origin, cultural distance, consumption habits or in other
dimensions. In all these cases correcting the standard errors is not enough and, to
avoid an omitted variables bias, it is necessary to adopt a different specification
which explicitly takes into account these potential spillovers. This is done in
following subsections.
20 Immigrant stocks in the gravity equation are defined by province of residence.
21 We thank an anonymous referee for having raised this issue.
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5.1 Inter-province spillovers: the role of geographic proximity
Most of the papers existing in the literature, and the specification of Eq. (1), do not
allow for geographic spillovers from immigration on trade. However, taking into
account potential spillovers is important. Province i may, for instance, have a low
stock of immigrants coming from a specific country, but may be surrounded by
provinces in which immigrants from that country are located in large amount. Now,
depending on the geographic scale of ethnic networks, this province may also benefit
from proximity to immigrant-abundant provinces. Moreover, if there are inter-
province spillovers, and the provinces’ immigrant stocks are spatially correlated, then
the coefficient on a province’s own immigration may also pick up the effect of
immigrants located in other provinces, generating an omitted variables bias.
This issue was investigated by Herander and Saavedra (2005) for the US. The
authors compared the estimated effects of local immigrant populations on US states’
exports to the effects of out-of-state populations of the same immigrant group and
found the former effect to be greater than the latter. They interpreted this result as
consistent with the importance of proximity to immigrant networks. A similar
approach is adopted in a recent article by Artal-Tur et al. (2012) who investigated
the same issue for Italy, Spain and Portugal using NUTS-3 level data. As a proxy of
spillovers, they considered the immigrants outside the province, and the immigrants
in adjacent and non-adjacent provinces in a log-log specification estimated with
OLS and found that all these variables, unlike the province’s own stock of
immigrants, were not significantly associated with trade.
Here, we exploit the very fine spatial disaggregation of Italian trade and immigration
data to shed light on the importance of geographic proximity for the trade-creating
effect of immigrants. In our specification, spillovers are captured by the number of
immigrants of a given ethnicity located outside the province within a distance d of
25 km, between 25 and 50 km, between 50 and 100 km, between 100 and 200 km,
and over 200 km, as visualized in panel (a) of Fig. 2 by the concentric circles drawn,
as an example, in the case of Genoa, Naples, and Palermo.22 The simultaneous
inclusion of all these controls allows us to have a clearer idea of the existence of, and
of the spatial decay of, the spillovers related to ethnic networks. Indeed, we expect the
amount of contacts between individuals living in different provinces, and knowledge
spillovers accordingly, to decline with distance. The specification becomes
lnð1 þ XijtÞ ¼ drj þ hjt þ /rt þ a lnðYit1 Yjt1Þ þ b lnð1 þ IMMijt1Þ
þ
X5
d¼1
kd lnð1 þ IMMdijt1Þ þ c lnðdistanceijÞ þ q contiguityij þ ijt
ð2Þ
and d it is an index which takes values from 1 to 5, for immigrants of ethnicity j
living in a different province within a distance of 25, 25–50, 50–100, 100–200 km
and more than 200 km from province i, respectively.
22 Distances are computed using the provinces’ centroids. More in detail, the spillover variables were
computed by aggregating the stocks of immigrants of all provinces falling within the radius d.
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The results from the OLS estimation are reported in Table 4 and refer to the
benchmark specification on the sample excluding Rome and Milan. Column (1)
shows the results for exports. First, the coefficient for the province’s own stock of
immigrants is only slightly reduced by the inclusion of the spillover variables, and
falls to 0.104 (instead of 0.121, as reported in column (6) of Table 3). Immigrants of
the ethnic group j, located within 50 km from province i have a positive effect on
export flows from province i to the foreign country j. The effect of immigrants’
stocks only slightly weakens for residents outside the province and within 50 km,
but turns significant and negative for ethnic networks which are located quite far
away (more than 200 km) from province i. We interpret this as evidence of a trade-
diversion effect. Indeed, the existence of provinces sufficiently distant from
province i which are abundant in immigrants from country j puts them in a better
position than province i as far as trading with country j is concerned. In simple
terms, provinces seem to compete for the trade-enhancing factor embedded in
immigrants. A similar pattern is observed for imports, as shown in column (2).
Positive spillovers are also in this case observed within a distance of 50 km, while
they change sign for longer distances. However, on imports the effect of out of
province immigrants is much lower than the one of those located in the province,
which is marginally affected by augmenting the specification with spillovers (0.341
instead of 0.347). Taken together these results do not show a substantial omitted
variables bias, and are broadly consistent with the findings of Herander and
Saavedra (2005) and Artal-Tur et al. (2012) about the importance of geographic
proximity for ethnic networks. However, we also find a trade-diversion effect
(negative spillovers) when large stocks of immigrants are located ‘too far away’,
and other provinces benefit from them.
5.2 Inter-ethnic spillovers
Although geographic spillovers have already been studied in the past, this paper is,
to the best of our knowledge, the first one to provide some preliminary evidence on
inter-ethnic spillovers. In order to shed light on inter-ethnic spillovers we first have
to define ‘close’ ethnic groups, controlling for economic size and distance between
countries. We take a simple approach and define proximity between ethnic groups in
two ways. First, to build the spillover variable for nationality j in province i we
aggregate all immigrants of other nationalities who speak the same language as
nationality j and located in the same province.23 Second, we use ‘affinity in trade’
between countries to build the spillover variables. In order to build this last variable,
we start by estimating a gravity equation using an unbalanced panel of 211 countries
over the period 1995–2002 (i.e., before our trade and immigrants stock are observed
in our sample). Regarding the specification, we include time-varying fixed effects
for both exporter and importer countries, to control for multilateral resistance terms;
while to control for bilateral trade costs we include usual country-pair geographical
variables such as distances, a dummy variable for borders, colonial ties, common
23 The variable ‘same language’ is taken from Mayer and Zignago (2011). For any country pair it takes
value 1 if a language is spoken by 9 % (or more) of the population in both countries and zero otherwise.
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language, and a dummy equal to 1 if the two countries shares a Preferential Trade
Agreement and zero otherwise. Trade data are taken from the BACII dataset Gaulier
and Zignago (2010) while gravity controls are from Mayer and Zignago (2011).
Then we used the average of the dyadic residuals for the whole period to define the
degree of trade affinity between the countries’ pairs. Intuitively, a positive residual
implies that observed exports are higher than expected (given the specification of
the gravity equation), which we interpret as a signal of affinity in trade. In what
follows, the inter-ethnic spillovers are computed selecting the trade partner with
highest residuals for each country, whose omission from the gravity equation should
cause the largest omitted variables bias. As we can see from columns (3) and (4) in
Table 4, augmenting the specification in Eq. (1) does not alter the direct effect of
immigrants from country j on trade between i and j. Both for exports and imports the
coefficient remains significant and of a comparable magnitude with respect to the
original OLS specification (see column (6) in Table 3). The coefficient of the inter-
ethnic spillovers is not significant for import flows, bringing evidence of a strong
average country specificity of tastes over ethnic-goods, while for exports the
spillover effect is positive and significant irrespective of the spillover variable used.
For exports, the size of the effect is much larger in the specification using language
proximity than in that using trade affinity. This can be rationalized on the ground
that most of the country pairs speaking the same language involve medium and low
income countries, for which the effect of immigrants could be higher.24 In this
sense, the spillover variable may act as a proxy of the stock of immigrants coming
from less developed countries, and capture a substantial heterogeneity in the effect
of immigrants by country of origin. We shed more light on this specific aspect in
Sect. 7.
6 Endogeneity and two-stage least squares
The OLS results in Sect. 4.1 confirm the evidence in the raw data and suggest that
immigrants may have a positive effect on both imports and exports, but larger for
the former. However, a potential pitfall with the OLS estimates is that even after
controlling for trading-pair fixed effects immigrant inflows may be endogenous
with respect to export or import flows. The endogeneity problem could be
determined, for instance, by trading-pair time-variant unobservables which
simultaneously affect immigrant flows and trade. To the best of our knowledge
there have been few attempts to address this issue in the literature. Combes et al.
(2005) studied the role of domestic migrations in shaping trade between French
regions. They sought to address the potential endogeneity of migrations by using the
lagged stock of immigrants (15 years before). A similar instrument (lagged
immigrant stock) is used by Briant et al. (2009) who focus on the trade-creating
effect of foreign migrants in French departments. In both cases, the authors found
24 Data inspection reveals that English, French, Arabic, Spanish and Portuguese are the most spoken
languages in terms of country frequencies. The percentage of countries with yearly income less than
3,300 (12,000) US dollars (2002 value) are 52 (80), 85.7 (90.5), 60 (85), 60 (95) and 85.7 (85.7) for
English, French, Arabic, Spanish and Portuguese languages, respectively.
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very similar elasticities when using OLS and 2SLS. However, an important feature
of their analysis is that, unlike we do, they used cross-sectional data and were not
able to control for unobserved heterogeneity at the trading-pair level.25 An
attempt to address the endogeneity of immigrants in panel data was made by Peri
and Requena-Silvente (2010). The authors adopted a manifold strategy in
building a potential instrument, based on supply-push factors and motivated by
the presence of historical immigrant enclaves, as in Altonji and Card (1991). We
apply the same approach in the present case. The presence of a community of
immigrants from a given country in a certain Italian province is likely to decrease
immigration costs and raise returns to migration for new immigrants of the same
nationality that settle in that province. Indeed, co-nationals already present in a
province may offer hospitality, financial support or help new migrants to find a
job in the local labor market. For these reasons, we expect the stock of
immigrants to be highly correlated with the inflow of new immigrants.
Accordingly, we adopt the following procedure to build an instrumental variable.
We compute the total stock of immigrants by country for Italy as a whole in each
year, and we allocate it to each province according to the distribution of
immigrants by nationality across provinces in 1995. This ‘base’ year for
computing weights is chosen on the ground that before 1995 in Italy there were
only 95 provinces, and considering early years the weight would be zero for eight
provinces between 2002 and 2006, and for twelve provinces between 2006 and
2009.26 Since province-level data on the stock of immigrants by nationality are
not provided by ISTAT for 1995, we use the distribution of immigrants’ requests
for residence permits (‘permessi di soggiorno’) provided by the Ministry of
Interior. In this way, we compute an imputed stock of immigrants, which is used
as an instrument for the observed stock.
More in detail, define IMMijt the number of immigrants from country j located in
province i at time t, and IMMjt the total stock of immigrants from country j at time t
in Italy. Then the share of total migrants of nationality j residing in province i at
time t can be defined as
wijt ¼ IMMijt
IMMjt
: ð3Þ
After considering the lagged distribution of immigrants by nationality across
provinces wij95 and having defined IMMj0 the total stock of immigrants from country
j at the first year of the time interval we consider (time zero, that is 2002), the
imputed stock of immigrants becomes
25 Indeed, Combes et al. (2005) only considered 1993, while Briant et al. (2009) took the average of trade
flows over 3 years (1998, 1999 and 2000) for each de´partement-country pairs. Hence, both these studies
were unable to account for trading-pair unobserved heterogeneity.
26 As we said above, in 2006 four new provinces were created (in Sardinia), raising the total number of
provinces from 103 to 107. Hence, even fixing the base year at 1995, the instrument assumes value zero
for these four provinces. We avoided imputing weights based on subjective assumptions, but checked the
sensitivity to this issue by dropping observations for Sardinia after 2006, and did not obtain notable
differences in the 2SLS estimates.
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dIMMijt ¼ wij95IMMj0 þ wij95
Xt
q¼0
Fjq ¼ wij95ðIMMj0 þ
Xt
q¼0
FjqÞ ¼ wij95IMMjt ð4Þ
where Fjq is the total net inflow of immigrants from country j in Italy at time q. The
instrument is then given by the product of two terms, the first (wij95) exhibits
trading-pair variation, and the second (IMMjt) country by time variation. Thanks to
the product of the two terms, the imputed stock of immigrants varies simultaneously
at the province, country and time level. Imagine now that—as in the present case—
the immigrant stock is measured in logarithms. After taking logs, Eq. (4) becomes
lnðdIMMijtÞ ¼ lnðwij95Þ þ lnðIMMjtÞ ð5Þ
that is linear in two terms, one varying at the trading-pair level and the other at the
country-year level. This means that if one includes in the gravity equation province-
country and country-year fixed effects, they completely absorb the instrument’s
variation. Adding one to the stock of migrants before taking logs makes it no longer
possible to write the imputed stock of immigrants as a linear function of lnðwij95Þ
and lnðIMMjtÞ, that is
lnð1 þ dIMMijtÞ ¼ lnð1 þ wij95IMMjtÞ 6¼ lnðwij95Þ þ lnðIMMjtÞ ð6Þ
and the variation in the log of the modified imputed stock of immigrants (i.e., the
imputed stock after adding one) is now not completely absorbed by trading-pair and
country-year fixed effects. However, in this case the 2SLS estimates’ identification
does stem only from the nonlinearity of lnð1 þ dIMMijtÞ in these fixed effects, which
may be too weak in many cases (see Table 8 in Online-Appendix B where only few
residual variation remains after controlling for trading-pair fixed effects).27
As we said in Sect. 4.1, we do not only exploit this nonlinearity, but we also take
advantage of the cross sectional variation between provinces within the same
region, as we use trading-pair defined at the region-country level.
The main threat to identification comes from time-varying trading-pair
unobserved factors during the period observed which simultaneously affect
provinces’ trade with a given country and the stock of immigrants from that
country. In this respect, the main determinants of the imputed stock of immigrants
in Eq. (4) are presumably exogenous, i.e., uncorrelated with such unobservables.
Indeed, the net immigration flows by country to overall Italy in each year 2002–
2008 (Fjq) and the stock of immigrants by nationality in Italy in 2002 (IMMj0),
referring to the whole country, should not be affected by trading-pair shocks,
especially when shocks are related to very small geographical units, such as Italian
provinces. As for the remaining component, the distribution of residence permits by
nationality across provinces in 1995 (wij95), conditional on trading-pair fixed
27 Peri and Requena-Silvente (2010) estimate, for instance, the impact of immigrants on trade of Spanish
regions, and include in the gravity equation both region-country and country-year fixed effects. First, they
add one to both trade and the immigrant stock to retain observations with zeros in their logarithmic
specification, and, on top of that, in the 2SLS specification using the imputed stock of immigrants as the
excluded instrument, they omit trading-pair dummies from the first stage.
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effects, region-year and country-year fixed effects, should not be theoretically
correlated with any trading-pair time variant shock taking place during the
estimation period (2003–2009), especially given that our geographic units of
analysis (provinces) are relatively small. It may happen, for instance, that
immigrants decided to locate in specific provinces in 1995 because they were
predicting more local opportunities for trade growth with their home countries.
However, controlling for trading-pair (region-country) fixed effects helps address
this potential criticism, as the variation in the instrument which we are actually
exploiting is only that between provinces within the same region and for the same
country of origin of immigrants. For the instrument to fail it must be the case, for
instance, that immigrants from a specific foreign country back in 1995 chose to
locate in province A1 rather than in province A2 (both in region A) because A1
offered the best opportunities for them to trade with their home country. However,
this is very unlikely as provinces within the same region present the same (or very
similar) institutional and, often, socio-economic characteristics, and therefore
immigrants would have the same opportunity to trade with their home country
irrespective of the specific choice of province of initial location. This is clearly an
advantage of using very small geographical units of analysis, as this assumption
would be much more difficult to maintain in country-level or even in region-level
analyses. Moreover, the small size of provinces is important as it makes less likely
that migration flows from a specific foreign country toward a single Italian province
account for most immigration from that country toward Italy.
The results of the 2SLS estimation are reported in Table 5. Columns (1) and (2)
show the estimates for the model without spillovers. In the first-stage, the instrument
turns out to be very strong, with an F-test well above the threshold of 10 suggested
by Staiger and Stock (1997) to detect a potential weak instrument problem. The
export elasticity to immigrants is 0.13, similar to that estimated with OLS (0.12).
The estimated elasticity of imports is instead 0.59, larger than that obtained with
OLS, and larger than for exports. Thus our estimates of the pro-trade effect of
immigration are totally in line with the literature for exports, but larger for
imports.28
A potential problem with our identification strategy is related to the spatial
structure of the data. In particular, we wonder whether the distribution of
immigrants across Italian provinces in 1995 may be correlated with time-varying
bilateral determinants of trade between 2003 and 2009. This could be the case if the
distribution of immigrants of the same nationality but in other provinces in 1995
influenced the location choices of immigrants from country j in province i in the
same year, which is in turn correlated with the current distribution, and there are
inter-province spillovers in trade. A similar problem—also related to our previous
analysis—could be generated if location choices of immigrants from other countries
are correlated with those of country j, and there are inter-ethnic spillovers. In both
28 In the IZA Discussion Paper’s version of this paper we only reported the estimates for the sample
including Rome and Milan. When including these cities the elasticity of exports falls to 0.004 and ceases
to be statistically significant (SE = 0.038), while the elasticity of imports is only marginally affected
(0.548, SE = 0.053). This issue has been already discussed in Sect. 4.1 and Online-Appendix D.
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cases, estimating the specifications augmented with spillovers using 2SLS addresses
these additional concerns.
In columns (3) and (4) of Table 5, we report the specifications augmented with
the inter-province spillover variables (see Sect. 5), which have been instrumented
using the same shift-and-share procedure used to instrument a province’s own stock
of immigrants. The 2SLS estimates show for exports a faster spatial decay of the
effect of immigrants with distance compared with the OLS estimates in Table 4: the
coefficients are 0.110 for the province’s immigrant stock, 0.099 for immigrants
within 25 km (in other provinces) and 0.049 for immigrants between 25 and 50 km.
The effect is negative for immigrants in farther provinces, but is significant only for
the last category. For imports, the pattern of the coefficients is less clear cut. The
coefficient on the province’s stock of immigrants increases after including the
spillover variables (from 0.594 to 0.622), which are significant and positive for the
25, 25–50 and 50–100 km categories, 0.069, 0.114 and 0.147, respectively, and
negative and significant for the 100–200 km category, while the last category is not
statistically different from zero. It is hard to explain the different pattern of
geographical spillovers between imports and exports in the absence of additional
data. A potential explanation is related to the two different channels captured by the
coefficients (preference and business networks effects). In particular, the fact that
the spillover for imports seems to have a lower spatial decay may be related to a
variety of factors, such as the fact that immigrants may ‘shop around’, that is they
may travel across provinces to buy ethnic goods when they are not available locally,
especially when their supply is very spatially concentrated such in the case of ethnic
quarters. Such short-run movements may contribute to increasing imports but are
unlikely to transfer to natives relevant business-related knowledge, if the regions of
destination of these travels are already rich in immigrants. Just to take an example,
Chinese immigrants in the province of Pisa may for instance travel to Prato to buy
Chinese goods. These internal migrations certainly benefit Chinese importers
located in the Prato area, and spur their imports, while presumably they do not
provide any additional knowledge about doing business in China to natives located
in Prato, who already benefit from contacts with a large Chinese community.
The estimates with inter-ethnic spillovers based on linguistic proximity (i.e.,
speaking the same language) are shown in columns (5) and (6) of Table 5, and those
based on ‘trade affinity’ in columns (7) and (8). Both sets of estimates confirm the
early OLS results: inter-ethnic spillovers are statistically significant and positive
only for exports. In any case, the coefficient on the province’s own stock of
immigrants is largely unaffected by the inclusion of the spillover variables, i.e.,
there is no evidence of an omitted variables bias. This is what is mostly relevant for
the current paper, and for reasons of space a deeper understanding of the presence of
inter-ethnic spillovers in trade is left for future work.
7 Heterogenous effects
When the effect of immigrants is heterogeneous, the IVs estimates reported in the
previous section can be interpreted as Local Average Treatment Effects (LATE),
M. Bratti et al.
123
i.e., as the effect on trade of the immigrants whose stocks are affected by the
excluded instrument (the imputed stock of immigrants). In the presence of
heterogenous effects, the LATE is an ‘average’ effect and may hide substantial
differences across immigrants’ countries of origin, or along other dimensions. In
this section, we exploit the two-way geographical heterogeneity of our data to
explore differential effects in the trade-creating effect of immigrants.
As we have already stressed, Italy provides two interesting features: (i) the
‘super-diversity’ of immigration; (ii) a remarkable socio-economic diversity across
provinces, namely a strong North-South divide where Southern provinces lag
behind in terms of economic development. As far as the first point is concerned, if
immigrants are likely to reduce information costs, and contribute to enforcing
contracts (Rauch 2001), this is likely to happen the lower the level of development
of the countries where they come from. To test this hypothesis, we have classified
immigrants’ countries in four groups by level of Gross National Income per capita
(in US dollars): low, middle-low, middle-high and high income. The classification is
made by the World Bank, using an Atlas conversion factor to reduce the effect of
exchange rate fluctuations on cross-country income comparisons and the list of
countries in each category is included in Online-Appendix F. The results of the
2SLS estimation in the four samples are reported in columns (1)–(4) of Table 6. For
the high-income countries no significant effect neither on exports nor on imports
emerges. This is consistent with the hypothesis of these countries having well
developed markets and institutions, which are likely to provide rich trade-related
information and ensure contract enforcement without having to rely on the trade-
promotion effort of their citizens abroad. Moreover, models of consumption are
likely to be very similar across high-income countries, and we do not expect a
strong transplanted home bias effect in consumption. Switching to the middle-high
income category, we still do not observe any effect on exports, but a positive and
significant effect on imports emerges. We tend to rationalize this effect as the
consequence of partial differences in models of consumption between high-middle
income countries and Italy, a high-income country. At lower levels of income, we
find statistically significant effects on both exports and imports. For these countries,
where market institutions are not well developed, immigrants are more likely to
provide a valuable source of information and contract enforcement thanks to their
persisting links with their home countries. For middle-low and low-income
countries, a transplanted home bias is also likely to emerge, as the kind of goods
immigrants were used to consume at home are less likely to be produced by Italian
firms.
Another source of heterogeneity that we investigate is between ‘new’ (i.e.,
recently arrived) and ‘old’ communities of immigrants. We define two waves of
immigration. The ‘first wave’ includes the first twenty countries of origin of
immigrants, ordered according to the share in overall foreign born population in
Italy at the beginning of the period (2002). The ‘second wave’ is defined similarly,
but considering the first twenty countries of origin at the end of the period (2008),
excluding those that were in the first wave’s sample to avoid that the two groups
overlap. The full list of countries is reported in Online-Appendix F. The results are
reported in column (5) and (6) of Table 6. Interestingly, only first-wave immigrants
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seem to spur trade. A possible rationalization for this evidence is that knowledge
flows from immigrants to natives need time to materialize, for instance due to
immigrants’ segregation, and accordingly recently arrived communities of immi-
grants are unable to spur trade.29 As for imports, even if there is a home bias in
consumption, and new immigrants would prefer to consume their home goods, it
takes time to organize import activities. For instance, imports from origin countries
may require immigrants to create import-export firms (ethnic firms), or it may take
time for ‘native’ firms to evaluate the existence of a potential market for ‘ethnic
goods’, and its size. We leave further investigation of these hypotheses for future
work.
Italy is characterized by a very strong North-South divide. Firms operating in the
South are less productive (Aiello and Scoppa 2000) due to inefficiencies in the
public sector, the presence of organized crime, credit constraints, loosely
implemented institutional rules, which along with other factors make them also
less likely to export (Castellani 2002). Firms located in the North of Italy are instead
more productive and better integrated in the European market, as reflected by the
average trade openness; over the sample period.30 Thus, in presence of market
imperfections, immigrants may spur firms’ exporting activities especially in the
South. To investigate this hypothesis, the benchmark specifications of the export
and import equations have been modified to include interaction terms between the
stock of immigrants and macro-area dummies (North, Center, South and Islands).31
The results are reported in column (7) of Table 6. In line with the theoretical
predictions, a significant positive effect of immigrants on exports is estimated only
for Southern Italy. The effect on imports turns out instead to be positive irrespective
of the macro-region considered, suggesting again an important role for transplanted
home bias in fostering import flows.
Early work suggests that immigrants of different age, type (family vs.
individual), education and skills may have heterogeneous effects on trade. Head
and Ries (1998) found for instance that independent immigrants, who presumably
had stronger ties with their home country, had a larger impact on trade than family
immigrants. Herander and Saavedra (2005) reported that older and skilled
immigrants had a higher effect on trade. This could be rationalized with these
immigrants having more information on their home country, either through life
experience, education or skills. Unfortunately, ISTAT does not provide the socio-
economic characteristics of immigrants. However, we make an attempt to
29 This explanation is only apparently in contrast with our specification of the gravity equation in which
the stock of immigrants at time t  1 affects trade at time t. First, using region by country fixed effects we
are exploiting within-region variation across provinces, and not only yearly changes in the stocks of
immigrants. Second, yearly changes in the stock of immigrants do not necessarily refer to first-time
immigrants, but also to immigrants moving from other provinces. The probability that immigrants might
have transferred from other provinces, and that they already have a good knowledge of Italy, is higher for
first-wave immigrants.
30 The ratio between exports plus imports over GDP for the provinces located in the North of the country
is about 0.51, while for the Center is 0.39, and for the South and Islands is 0.24—far below the country’s
average 0.39.
31 These interaction terms have been instrumented with interaction terms between macro-region
dummies and the imputed stocks of immigrants.
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investigate heterogeneous effects by immigrants’ education. We attributed immi-
grants to two educational categories (high educated vs. low educated) using data
provided by Docquier et al. (2009), which records immigrant stocks by gender and
educational attainment (primary, secondary and tertiary) in OECD countries in 1990
and 2000. Using data for Italy32 we rank the countries according to the percentage of
tertiary educated immigrants and identify (using a dummy variable) as high
educated nationalities those with a share above the median value. The regressions in
column (8) show that are especially low-educated immigrants which spur exports.
Indeed the effect is practically null for more educated (above median) immigrants.
Results are similar for imports: the effect is larger for low educated immigrants,
even though also highly educated immigrants have a positive effect on imports.
These results mimic our early findings on heterogenous effects by GDP, as average
education and GDP are highly correlated at the country level. The first-stage results
of all models are reported in Online-Appendix G and show no evidence of a weak
instruments’ problem.33
8 Concluding remarks
This paper seeks to contribute to the literature on the causal effect of immigrants on
international trade. The Italian case provides an ideal setting for shedding light on
the trade-immigration link thanks to the large number of ethnic groups (187) present
in the Italian territory, i.e., the Italian ‘‘super-diversity,’’ the very fine geographical
disaggregation of the migration and trade data (at the province level, NUTS-3), and
the lack of colonial, language or cultural ties with immigrants’ origin countries. The
potential endogeneity of immigration is addressed using a shift-and-share approach
based on the existence of immigrant enclaves. We have a number of interesting
results. First, distance seems to be a key factor for the ethnic networks relevant to
international trade. Indeed, although a province’s own stock of immigrants
generally has a larger effect than out-of-province immigrants, we find positive
spillovers of immigrants within a distance of 50 km for both exports and imports.
Interestingly enough, the spillovers change in sign when large communities of
immigrants are too far away and other provinces are presumably benefiting from
them (trade-diversion effect). We also provide preliminary evidence of inter-ethnic
spillovers on trade: exports of province i toward country j are not only influenced by
the stock of immigrants from country j (located in i) but also by ‘similar’
32 In the case of Italy reference years are 1991 and 2001; in our case we use the earliest data.
33 Since the Docquier et al. (2009) provides the skill structure of immigrants located in Italy for each
country of origin, one could also have included three different variables for low, medium and highly
educated immigrants in the gravity equation. However, this is not possible since the correlation
coefficients between the three different stocks of immigrants are very high in our estimation sample:
0.981 between low and medium educated immigrants, 0.947 between low and highly educated
immigrants and 0.985 between medium and highly educated immigrants. The high correlation between
the three stocks depends on the fact that the actual stocks by educational level are not provided by ISTAT
and must be imputed by applying the 2001 distribution by skill provided by Docquier et al. (2009) (which
is time and province invariant in our estimation period) to the observed total stocks of immigrants by
country of origin reported by ISTAT in each year.
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immigrants coming from other countries and located in the same province, where
‘similarity’ is defined either in terms of language proximity or affinity in trade. A
similar effect is not found for imports. Second, our IVs estimates generally point to
a larger effect of immigrants on imports than on exports. This is in line with the
theoretical expectations, since imports are affected by both the transplanted home
bias effect (i.e., the preference channel) and the business and social network effect
of immigrants on trade, while exports only by the second effect. Using IVs, we
estimate an elasticity of exports with respect of immigrants of 0.128 and of imports
of 0.594 (specification without spillovers in Table 5, the estimates are similar when
we account for spillovers). These figures imply that on average one more immigrant
coming from a foreign country, settling in an Italian province would directly
increase the yearly value of that province’s exports toward that very country by
20,968 US dollars and of imports by 76,432 US dollars (effects computed at the
sample mean of our estimation sample excluding Rome and Milan). Last but not
least, we show that the average effect of immigrants on trade hides a substantial
heterogeneity. Consistent with the idea of immigrants providing a valuable source
of information and contract enforcement when market institutions are not well
developed, we find the pro-trade effect of immigrants to be larger for immigrants
coming from low-income countries, and for Southern Italy’s provinces, in which
firms are less productive and efficient. Moreover, trade creation appears to be larger
for ‘first-wave’ immigrants, those who settled in Italy earlier. A possible
rationalization of this last result is that the pro-trade effect of immigrants may
originate not from information spillovers to natives but from immigrants exploiting
their superior knowledge of the home country by organizing themselves import-
export activities through ethnic firms. We leave further investigation of this
hypothesis for future work.
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